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Abstract 
Some Researchers consider soccer matches as the stylization of a war in other 
battlefields. Such approach was largely used to interpret the violent 
phenomena related to the soccer environment, while  less attention has been 
paid to the «potential» role of political and economic interactions between 
countries in determining the aggressive attitude of players on the pitch. In 
our paper we empirically investigate if and how political hostility among 
countries reverberates on a soccer pitch by influencing players’ 
aggressiveness. The analysis focuses on official matches played by national 
teams in the final phases of the European and World Cup tournaments since 
2000. We estimate a Negative Binomial regression including both political 
and sport variables, and we find that (a) commercial hostility; (b) the level of 
diplomatic relationships, (c) power asymmetry and (d) education gap 
between countries are positively and significantly associated with 
aggressiveness of the players on the pitch, approximated by the number of 
yellow and red cards. That is, briefly stated, international hostility 
reverberates into the pitch. Moreover, sport covariates present the expected 
signs, namely results show that the closeness of the teams, their ranking and 
the stage of the game (knockout stages with respect to the group phases) are 
also crucial in determining the cautions. 
 
Keywords: international hostility, diplomacy, aggressiveness on the 
pitch, soccer, football.  
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Introduction 
 
International soccer matches have been often related to political relations. If 
we consider Koreas, in September 10, 2008, the national soccer teams of 
Korea Democratic Popular Republic and Korea Republic were to play their 
match for the 2nd stage group qualification of the World Cup 2010 at the 
Shanghai Hongkou Stadium in China. The match was to be played on 
neutral site. The choice was determined due to political reasons: North 
Koreans are not willing to play the South Korean anthem and to display its 
flag on their own territory. A more striking political accident occurred 
between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969 and it has been popularized by 
Kapuściński (1991). It ended up in the so called “Soccer War”. Moreover, in 
1986 at the World Cup, when the English national soccer team had been 
eliminated at the quarter-final stage by Argentina, many observers recalled 
the political hostility between the two nations because of the Malvinas-
Falkland war. 
Briefly, the importance of soccer appears to go beyond the sport 
competition. In many cases, nationalism emerges when national teams take 
part into major soccer international competitions.  
Moreover, some sociological approaches consider a soccer match has 
the stylization of a war in other battlefields (Elias and Dunning, 1986). That 
kind of approach was largely used to interpret the violent phenomena 
related to soccer, as hooliganism (Caruso and Di Domizio, 2012; Leeson et 
al., 2012). Less attention has been paid to the «potential» role of political 
and economic interactions in determining the aggressive attitude of players 
on the pitch. 
Our paper investigates if and how diplomatic and trade relations 
among countries reverberate on the soccer pitch. The empirical analysis 
focuses on matches played by national teams in the final phases of the 
European and World Cup since 2000. In order to study the emergence of 
aggressiveness, as dependent variable, we use the number of yellow and red 
cards (namely the pitch penalties) received by players as a proxy of their 
aggressiveness. Then, we estimate a regression equation including political 
and economic variables. Since the dependent variable is a count, the 
empirical models are estimated by means of Negative Binomial Regressions 
with Maximum Likelihood techniques. Once the sport control variables were 
added in the regression, results show that diplomatic and trade relations, 
together with power and education asymmetry are significantly associated 
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with players’ aggressiveness on the pitch. Moreover, sport covariates show 
the expected signs, such as the closeness of the teams, their ranking and the 
stage of the game (knockout stages) are also crucial in determining the 
penalties on the pitch. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 1 describes the role of 
violence in sport contexts and particularly in the football environment; 
section 2 discusses data set composition and the variables used in the 
empirical investigation. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy and 
discusses the results; section 4 concludes. 
 
1. Soccer-related violence: an overview 
 
The relationship between sport and violence has been widely debated in 
judicial, sociological and economic literature, particularly for 
soccer(Giulianotti et al., 1994; Dunning, 1999). Many factors contribute to 
make soccer a stage for violent episodes: it mimics a conflict, it is a team 
sport and it is also associated with a shared sense of community. This is 
why Elias and Dunning (1986) claim that soccer matches stylize and 
miniaturize the war. This approach evidently takes into account the idea 
according to which violence cannot be removed from the sport environment. 
Different interpretations have been produced to explain such a relevant 
presence of violence in a sport/soccer context. For example Bandura (1973) 
considers the violence as a consequence of the frustration generated by a 
defeat, while Dunning (1999) explains that aggressiveness associated to 
soccer matches is basically masculinity, territorial struggle and excitement. 
Following the latter idea, the attention was mainly devoted to the analysis 
of the hooliganism phenomenon, originated in modern time from the United 
Kingdom and spread in almost all of European countries (Spaaij, 2008). 
Other contributions incorporate actions of hooligans in a framework of 
rational behaviour also in order to identify the optimal counter strategy 
implemented by governments (Poutvaara and Priks, 2009; Marie, 2011). 
The presence of violence in a sport context is also consistent with the 
multi-shaped interpretation of sport as expounded by Caruso (2008; 2011), 
who extends the definition presented by Downward and Riordan (2007) and 
builds on Boulding’s contributions (1973; 1978). More precisely drawing 
from Caruso (2011) we espouse the following definition of sport: «a joint 
indivisible good, which is produced and consumed by different agents at a 
certain place and time. It can have multiple shapes. In fact, it is a 
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combination of: (i) a market good, (ii) a relational good and (iii) an 
expression of threat, power and coercion. All components differ in intensity, 
but differently from (i) and (iii) the relational component must be necessarily 
positive». Agents have utility functions which incorporate market goods, 
relational goods, and eventually hatred against other persons. Agents are 
not only committed to consumption but they are also producing units. 
That is, sport has a multiple nature so implying that the social 
outcome emerging from sport would depend on intensity of the different 
elements. Particularly, when the relational nature of sport dominates the 
other components, the relationship with violence may be reversed and a 
beneficial effect of sport participation can be envisioned. Caruso (2011) 
tested this idea by studying the negative relationship between sport and 
crime. This could support the idea of the appropriate role of sport to prevent 
violent behaviour and promote individual and community development. In 
spite of this potential benefit, the multi-shaped definition mentioned above, 
takes into account some violent and aggressive components of sport. Sport 
can involve threat, coercion, aggressive behaviour and extreme competition. 
This is not a novelty. Consider some examples drawn from history. Since the 
end of World War II, the Soviet bloc organized their sport system through 
security and armed forces. Most sport heroes were soldiers or police officers. 
Sport was designed to control the society (Howell, 1975; Cooper, 1989; 
Riordan, 1993). Needless to say, sport was also interpreted as ancillary to 
foreign policy. In fact, success in sport was intended to support USSRand 
other socialist countries to gain international prestige (Riordan, 1974).  
Recently, researchers began to use sport to empirically disentangle the 
effect of culture, institutions and poverty in determining violent behaviour 
inside the pitch. For example Miguel et al. (2008) analysed the relationship 
between violent behaviour of the single player on the football pitch and the 
history of civil conflict in the player’s provenance, using data from the major 
six professional European football leagues. They used the number of yellow 
and red cards attributed by referees to the players and, after the 
introduction of sport, economic and geographical control variables, they 
included the number of years passed after a civil war between 1980 and 
2005. They found a strong relationship between the latter explanatory 
variable and the number of yellow and red cards, supporting the idea that 
the national culture and identity influence the violent attitude of players on 
the pitch. Different results are presented by Cuesta and Bohórquez (2012) in 
their empirical investigation on Copa Libertadores.1 Taking into account a 
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broader concept of national culture, they contested the number of years 
passed after a civil war as a measure of violence in a country. Adding other 
variables in order to approximate the violent attitude of each country, such 
as the years of dictatorship, the homicides rate, the number of years of 
armed conflict within each country and the related homicides rate, have 
shown  that the violent behaviour of players depends exclusively on soccer 
characteristics, and that their nationality is not significant as far as their 
violent behaviour on the pitch is concerned. 
In what follows, we focus on the aggressive behaviour emerging on the 
pitch at the match level. In particular, we contribute to the existing 
literature by empirically investigating the relevance of political, diplomatic, 
education and economic linkages between countries involved in the match 
under investigation, on the sanctions attributed by the referee on the soccer 
pitch, namely yellow and red cards. 
 
2. The variables 
 
The empirical analysis covers the period 2000-2012, and focuses on matches 
of World Cups and Euro Championships. We concentrate on the final phases 
instead of qualifying rounds in order to avoid any potential bias on the 
dependent variable determined by the home field influence on referees 
(Nevill et al., 2002). The matches under investigation are 316, 192 of World 
Cup and 124 of Euro Championship. We consider group stage matches (240) 
and knockout stage matches (76), namely tie-matches and finals. The 
competitions involved 62 European and Extra-European nations considering 
the team Yugoslavia (at the Euro Championship 2000) differently with 
respect to Serbia and Montenegro. Details about the competitions under 
investigation are in the table 1. 
 
Table 1: Data set composition 
Competition Year Hosting Country Group matches 
Knockout 
matches 
Euro 
Championship 
2000 Belgium/Netherlands 24 7 
World Cup 2002 Japan/South Korea 48 16 
Euro 
Championship 
2004 Portugal 24 7 
World Cup 2006 Germany 48 16 
Euro 
Championship 
2008 Austria/Switzerland 24 7 
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World Cup 2010 South Africa 48 16 
Euro 
Championship 
2012 Poland/Ukraine 24 7 
 
The dependent variable is labelled Aggressiveness and it denotes the 
number of sanctions attributed by the referee to the players during the 
match.2 It is computed as follows: 
 
Aggressiveness = Yellow cards·1 + Second yellow cards·2 + Direct red 
cards·3. 
 
The dependent variable needs some explanation. First, we pay our attention 
on referees’ sanctions instead of fouls committed because the latter are not 
homogeneous and available for all matches. At the same time, needless to 
say, there is a strong positive correlation between the actual number of fouls 
committed and the number of yellow and red cards. Briefly, the number of 
cards may be considered a good approximation of the aggressiveness on the 
field. Secondly, we prefer to weigh the referee cautions in order to take into 
account that the second yellow card, usually, is rewarded for some more 
serious foul than those which have determined the first sanction. Anyway, it 
is less serious than those that determined a single direct red card. In fact, 
this is confirmed by the fact that the second yellow card does not imply a 
disqualification of the player for one or more of future matches.3 Note that 
we have not made distinctions between yellow and red card received 
because of violent behaviour and those received for other irregular conducts. 
For example it is possible that one player receives yellow/red card because of 
verbal protest or for excess of elation, but that distinction is not included in 
our dependent variable identification. 
The list of independent explanatory variables includes economic, political, 
education and sports data. One group focuses on the relationship between 
countries. In particular, we take into account some measure of hostility both 
in terms of commercial and political-diplomatic relations. Hereafter, 
commercial hostility is defined as the attitude of the economy of country A 
to penetrate in the economy of country B. Such idea is drawn from that 
explained by Hirschmann (1945/1980) according to which trade can be 
interpreted as a source of power and influence between countries. Then, we 
calculated, for each dyad of countries, two penetration indexes able to 
capture that attitude; the penetration index for the country A is computed 
as the ratio between exports from country A to B, divided by the total 
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imports of country B. The same we do for the penetration index of country B 
(exports from country B to country A divided by total imports of country A).4 
At the end, we select the highest index among the two as the proxy of our 
measure of Commercial Hostility variable. It is bounded between 0 and 1, 
and we expect a positive sign of the associated coefficient.  
In addition, we introduce a dummy variable, Diplomatic Hostility, to 
capture the level of diplomatic relations between the countries. This dummy 
is constructed on information drawn from the Correlates of War (COW) 
Diplomatic Exchange data set.5 The dyadic data set describes the level of 
diplomatic exchange between members in the COW system at the level of 
chargé d'affaires, minister, and ambassador between members of the 
interstate system.6 The dummy equals 1 when the level of diplomatic 
exchange in the period considered is above 3 (the maximum diplomatic 
representation in the other country), indicating potential tensions between 
countries, and 0 otherwise). We use the diplomatic relations recorded for the 
period 1995-2005. We also introduce a variable to evaluate power gap 
among countries by means of the National Material Capability data set.7 
The Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) summarizes the power 
of each country using data on total and urban population, iron and steel 
production, energy consumption, military personnel and military 
expenditure.8 The variable included in the regression is the absolute value 
of difference of CINC for the countries involved (CINC Difference). We 
expect a positive sign of the coefficient because we can suppose that the 
football match may be seen as an opportunity of revenge for countries with 
less power. Put differently, such redemption chance could be instilled into 
the national football teams forcing the players to a more aggressive behavior 
on the pitch. 
Eventually, we introduce a control variable approximating the 
education gap between countries. The variable is calculated as the ratio 
between the enrolments in secondary education expressed as a percentage of 
the population of official secondary education age.9 The expectation is for a 
positive sign of the associated coefficient, and the explanation may be based 
on the same ground of the previous hostility variables. 
A second group includes sport variables. First, we consider the 
closeness of the game since it should influence the level of aggressiveness 
and, as a consequence, the number of fouls and referees’ sanctions. To 
capture that, we introduce the variable Ranking Difference, that is, the 
absolute value of the difference between the FIFA World Ranking of each 
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team.10 We do not formulate unidirectional expectation on the sign of the 
coefficient. On one hand, if a match is balanced, it could be harsher. On the 
other hand, when the ranking difference increases, the underdog team may 
behave more aggressively to reduce the distance in sport talent. A possible 
alternative measure of the closeness of the game may be introduced using 
the points attributed by the FIFA in order to list its official ranking. Then, 
the variable Points Difference measures the absolute value of the difference 
in points achieved by each team in the FIFA World Ranking.11 Moreover, we 
introduce a dummy (World Cup) to denote whether the match has been 
played in the World Cup tournament. The dummy Knockout Stage denotes 
whether the match is a tie-match or not. The expectation is for a positive 
sign of associated coefficients to both variables. Another dummy variable 
(Hosting Country) is added to the data set to highlight matches played by 
the national team of the country hosting the competition. This has been 
made in order to take into account the potential home field bias determined 
by the referee subjection in distributing sanctions (Dawson et al., 2007) and 
secondly to catch the likely agonistic over-fierceness of the national teams 
players of the hosting country inflamed by local supporters. To take into 
account referees’ attitudes, we introduce a dummy (Peripheral) which is 1 if 
the referee do not come from major federations, namely UEFA and 
CONMEBOL.12 This variable tries to catch the potential bias in the yellow 
and red cards distribution determined by the lower opportunity of referees 
coming from peripheral federations (such as AFC, CAF, CONCACAF and 
OFC) to face with high level matches during the regular season.13  
Eventually, we introduce other dummy variables: (1) the first (Over 
time) captures matches ended up in overtime; (2) some geographical 
dummies (Africa, Asia and Oceania) that indicate matches involving teams 
from Africa, Asia and Oceania, respectively. These dummies are introduced 
to consider the different approach that teams from peripheral areas, on the 
soccer perspective, may have respect to those coming from the core of 
football dominance located in the South America and Europe. Descriptive 
statistics of variables are presented in table 2. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for dependent and explanatory variables 
Variables Obs Avg Min Max SD Source 
Aggressiveness 316 5.022 0 24 3.11 
Our elaboration on 
data FIFA and 
UEFA 
Ranking Difference 316 18.56 1 104 16.8 FIFA World 
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Points Difference 316 166.83 1 1326 191.22 Ranking 
Commercial Hostility 316 0.047 0 0.526 0.069 
IMF Direction of 
Trade 
Power gap (CINC 
Difference) 
316 0.0184 1.4 e-005 0.167 0.029 Correlates of War 
Education gap 308 1.416 1 8 0.872 World Bank 
Dummies Obs 0 1  
Diplomatic Hostility:    
Correlates of War 
1970-2005 316 183 133 
1990-2005 316 223 93 
1995-2005 316 230 86 
Knockout Stage 316 240 76 
FIFA and UEFA 
World Cup 316 124 192 
Hosting Country 316 269 47 
Over Time 316 292 24 
African 316 270 50 
Asia 316 277 39 
Oceania 316 306 10 
Peripheral 316 246 70 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the density function of the dependent variable 
Aggressiveness. 
 
 0
 0,02
 0,04
 0,06
 0,08
 0,1
 0,12
 0,14
 0,16
 0,18
 0  5  10  15  20  25
R
e
la
ti
v
e
 F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
Figure 1. 'Cruelty' Density Function
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As showed by figure 1 the dependent variable is far to be considered 
normally distributed, and the same is for the hypothesis of a log-normal 
distribution. To confirm, tests on the hypothesis of the normality 
distribution on Aggressiveness and on its logarithm were performed. Results 
are shown in table 3. 
 
Table 3. Normality character and tests on dependent variable 
 Aggressiveness (316 obs.) Log of Aggressiveness (306 
obs) 
Skewness 1.589 -0.352 
Kurtosis 5.524 0.256 
Doornik-Hansen test 
86.02 
(2.08e-019) 
6.271 
(0.043) 
Shapiro-Wilk test 
0.896 
(6.87e-014) 
0.968 
(2.51e-006) 
Lilliefors test 
0.158 
(~=0) 
0.117 
(~=0) 
Jarque-Bera test 
535.046 
(6.55e-117) 
7.16 
(0.028) 
P-value of normal and log-normal distribution test in parenthesis 
 
The density function of Aggressiveness best fits with a Poisson distribution 
for count data. To verify, table 4 shows the observed Aggressiveness 
distribution among matches and that expected according to a Poisson 
distribution of the variable Aggressiveness. It was calculated using the 
average of Aggressiveness as the fixed parameter of the Poisson probability 
distribution.  
 
Table 4. Observed and expected value of Aggressiveness distribution 
among matches  
Aggressiveness Observed matches Expected matches 
0 10 2.08 
1 12 10.46 
2 36 26.26 
3 48 43.97 
4 49 55.20 
5 52 55.44 
6 33 46.41 
7 20 33.30 
8 20 20.91 
9 10 11.67 
≥10 26 10.24 
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Total 316 316 
 
4. The empirical strategy 
 
Considering the characteristics of the dependent variable as specified in the 
tables 3 and 4, we use a Negative Binomial Regression (Verbeek, 2004; 
Green, 2008). We use negative binomial rather than Poisson models because 
of over-dispersion between mean and variance of dependent variable. We 
prefer to estimate and represent the Negative Binomial I and II regressions, 
whose results are described in table 5.14 
 
Table 5. Maximum Likelihood Estimation – Negative Binomial Regression I and II 
Robust Standard Errors. 308 observations for the period 2000-2012 
Dependent variable: Aggressiveness 
 NEG BIN I NEG BIN II 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Coefficient 
Commercial Hostility 
1.228** 
(0.539) 
1.401* 
(0.737) 
Diplomatic Hostility  
0.381*** 
(0.116) 
0.302** 
(0.120) 
Power gap (CINC 
Difference) 
5.346*** 
(1.062) 
5.204*** 
(1.378) 
Education gap 
0.226*** 
(0.069) 
0.538*** 
(0.122) 
Ranking Difference 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.010*** 
(0.004) 
Knockout Stage Matches 
0.383*** 
(0.122) 
0.311** 
(0.132) 
World Cup Matches 
0.726*** 
(0.138) 
0.500*** 
(0.127) 
Hosting Country 
0.495*** 
(0.129) 
0.394*** 
(0.113) 
Over Time 
-0.041 
(0.206) 
0.062 
(0.170) 
Africa 
-0.564*** 
(0.199) 
-0.597*** 
(0.159) 
Asia 
-0.263** 
(0.130) 
-0.265* 
(0.142) 
Oceania 
0.123 
(0.238) 
0.150 
(0.196) 
Periphery 
0.008 
(0.113) 
-0.059 
(0.126) 
δ2 
1.447*** 
(0.192) 
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α2  
0.405*** 
(0.050) 
Log-likelihood  -848.42 -831.28 
LR Test (  
 ) 
126.1 184,6 
Wald Test 
Robust F (4, 294) 16.38 28.58 
Standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance:***>99%, **>95%, *>90%. 
 
Note that we follow the previous econometric literature leaving out the 
constant from the regression equation. LR and Wald tests confirm the joint 
statistical significance of the (first group) variables associated to commercial 
hostility, diplomatic relationships, international leadership recognition and 
education gap. The log-likelihood values suggest preferring the NEG BIN II 
model to the NEG BIN I; for this reason, we comment only the first. 
Considering the variables of the first group we note that they have all 
a positive impact on Aggressiveness. First, being a continue variable ranged 
between 0 and 1, we can calculate that an increase of one percentage point 
in the Commercial Hostility implies an increase by 1.4 percentage points in 
the conditional average of Aggressiveness. It is the same for the variable 
CINC Difference and for the Education gap for which each increase in one 
point determines an increase of conditional average of Aggressiveness of 5.2 
and 0.54 percentage points respectively. Considering the Diplomatic 
Hostility, when political tensions between countries are registered by our 
dummy variable, the conditional average of Aggressiveness increases of 35% 
respect to matches played between countries with regular relations. 
As expected, the sport-related variables are significant in determining 
the level of aggressiveness on the pitch. In particular, for knockout matches 
and for those of the World Cup, the expected level of aggressiveness 
increases, on average (ceteris paribus), of about 36.5% and 64.9% 
respectively. A negative correlation appears between the closeness of the 
match and the expected Aggressiveness, supporting the idea that the 
underdog team exhibits more aggressive attitude on the pitch even if the 
marginal effect is not so strong. The magnitude of the coefficient of 
regression associated to the Ranking Difference means that a one unit rise 
in the absolute difference in the FIFA World Ranking between teams 
produces an increase in the conditional average of Aggressiveness of 0.01. 
According to the dummy variable, Hosting Country, its related coefficient is 
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significant and has the expected sign. From our regression it emerges that, 
when the national team of the hosting country is involved in the match, the 
conditional average of Aggressiveness increases about 48.3%. Statistical 
significance emerges from the dummies associated to football peripheral 
with the exclusion of Oceania; according to our econometric investigation 
when teams from Asia and Africa play, the aggressiveness on the pitch 
reduces about 23.2 and 44.9, respectively. At the end no statistical effect on 
aggressiveness may be attributed to the matches ended in over- time and 
those referred by referees from peripheral federations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The main result we would claim for this paper is that political hostility 
between countries affect and shape behaviour of players on soccer pitch. In 
particular, the empirical findings show that the players’ aggressiveness is 
positively related to some political variables. In fact, we considered as 
dependent variable the number of yellow and red cards (the pitch penalties) 
as a proxy of the players’ aggressiveness and estimated a regression 
equation including political, education and sport variables. The analysis 
focused on international matches played by national teams in the Euro 
Championships and World Cup tournaments for the period 2000-2012. Since 
the dependent variable is an event count, we used a Negative Binomial 
regression. Results show that the coefficient associated to the variable 
approximating the commercial hostility between countries is of statistical 
significance and positive. The same is for variable capturing the diplomatic 
tension and the education gap. A significant association is also shown for a 
variable constructed to capture the different level of power among countries. 
To summarize, we find that (a) the commercial hostility, (b) the level of 
diplomatic relationships, (c) the power gap between countries, and (d) 
education gap are positively and significantly associated to players’ 
aggressiveness on the soccer pitch. That is, briefly stated, international 
hostility reverberates into the pitch. These results enrich the evidence 
provided by Miguel et al. (2008) and Cuesta and Bohórquez (2012). 
Differently from these papers, our work in particular, focuses more on 
international relations rather than internal conflict or violence. In this way, 
we capture how soccer can be interpreted as a way for revenge of national 
pride with respect to other countries.  
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Finally, our result may be appraised in both political and sport 
perspectives. First of all, we confirm that the approaches which consider 
football matches as a battle are not so far from the truth, in particular for 
national teams playing in the major football competitions. Secondly, we can 
hypothesize a possible reduction of the aggressiveness on the pitch in the 
future international competitions since the process of football globalization 
is going to reduce the inequalities in the skills of football players all over the 
world (Milanovic, 2005). To conclude, we can formulate a suggestion for 
international football associations to well consider both football and political 
factors when the soccer agenda is going to be filled in, especially for the 
organization of international competitions and the scheduling of qualifying 
matches, in order to reduce the potential aggressiveness on the pitch. 
 
 
Notes 
1 This is the Latin America equivalent to Europe’s Champions League made up by 
teams of South America countries and Mexico. 
2 Data on sanctions for Euro Championships are retrieved on UEFA official web site in 
the statistic section, and for World Cup matches on http://livescore.football-
data.co.uk/ in the section World Cup. 
3 Alternative estimations were performed using the number of yellow and red card 
without weighs or considering a red card as a double yellow card, and no relevant 
differences emerged in terms of statistical significance and magnitude of the 
coefficients associated to the explanatory variables. 
4 Data on commercial flows are provided by the International Monetary Fund - 
Direction of Trade - data set (May, 2013). All data are expressed in current US 
dollars; imports are those including cost, insurance and freight. Note that exports and 
imports of Serbia are that of Republic of Serbia with the exemption of 2000 when data 
refers to Serbia and Montenegro. 
5 Data are available in the COW official web site (www.correlatesofwar.org/) in the 
section «Diplomatic Exchange, 1871-2005» (version 2006.1). 
6 Details about data set and its use in the literature on international diplomatic 
relations in Small and Singer (1966; 1973) and Small (1977). 
7 The data set is provided by the Correlates of War organization on its official web site 
(NMC version 4) and refers to the pioneering contribution of Singer et al. (1972) and 
Singer (1987). 
8 For details about the computation of CINC and the change in the CINC structure of 
version 4.0 see the section «National Material Capabilities» in the COW official web 
site. Note that CINC version 4.0 extended data to 2007, while data for the period 
2008-2012 are not available. For this reason we use the contemporary CINC data for 
the period 2000-2006 and for the following period 2008-2012 we use data 2007. 
9 The Education gap is calculated taking the maximum value of the two percentages as 
the numerator. For this reason the index has the minimum value of 1 and is 
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increasing in the school enrolment distance between countries. Data are from 
UNESCO - Institute for Statistics - and are retrieved from the Catalog Sources of 
World Development Indicators – World Bank. For some countries we were forced to 
use the closest (yearly) data available respect to the referring year. Data on Côte 
d’Ivoire and North Korea are not available. We are grateful to an anonymous referee 
who suggested the inclusion of the educational variable in the econometric 
investigation. 
10 Ranking data are released by the FIFA at the start of the competition under 
investigation on the following dates: Euro Championship 2000 (7 June 2000), World 
Cup 2002 (15 My 2002), Euro Championship 2004 (9 June 2004), World Cup 2006 (17 
May 2006), Euro Championship 2008 (4 June 2008), World Cup 2010 (26 May 2010), 
Euro Championship 2012 (6 June 2012). Data are promptly retrievable at the 
following link: www.fifa.com/worldranking/rankingtable/index.html (May 2013). We 
prefer to use FIFA World Ranking rather than that presented in Torgler (2006), 
based on the historical performances of national teams, to catch the current features 
of matches. 
11 The procedure for calculating the points and related ranking is available on the FIFA 
official site at the link: http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/fifafacts/r&a-
wr/52/00/97/fs-590_10e_wrpoints.pdf (May 2013). In the regression we prefer to use 
the Ranking Difference instead of Points Difference even if no relevant differences 
emerge. 
12 As noted FIFA delegates the organization of football activities to six 
Confederations/Associations placed all over the world: Asian Football Confederation 
(AFC), Confédération Africaine de Football (CAF) in Africa, Confederation of North, 
Central and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF) in Northern and Central 
America, Confederacion Sudamericana de Fútebol (CONMEBOL) in South America, 
Oceania Football Confederation (OFC) in Oceania and Union of European Football 
Association (UEFA) in Europe. The activities also include the selection, training and 
monitoring of referees’ performance which depend on each single federation. 
13 Respect to the potential bias of the referees use of cautions, determined by their 
nationality, useful and precious suggestions are due to an anonymous referee. 
14 Data of Diplomatic Hostility refers to the period 1995-2005. 
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